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ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

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UPHOLD THE PRESIDENT

DISARMAMENT THE GOAL

BY THE EDITOR

"Stand to our work and be wise—
Certain of sword and pen,
We are neither children nor gods,
But men in a world of men."

FIVE weeks hence the citizens of the United States will pass judgment upon the National Administration. That the Democrats will retain control of the Senate is a virtual certainty; the verdict, therefore, will be rendered through the election of members of the House of Representatives. That the great majority of 147 obtained by the successful party in 1912 in consequence of division of the opposition will be reduced materially must be anticipated. The Republican party has recovered from the shock of defeat and the Progressives have disintegrated to such an extent that they will wield no decisive influence as a unified force. A large majority of the seceders who followed Mr. Roosevelt undoubtedly will renew their former allegiance, but a considerable percentage may be expected to support Democratic candidates. Sufficient time has not yet elapsed, on the one hand, to quench wholly the fires of animosity engendered two years ago, while, on the other, the President has come to loom before thousands of sincere and conscien-

tious minds as larger, more real, more stable, and more effective than Mr. Roosevelt ever was or could now, after months of futile and belittling striving among factions within a faction, hope to become.

But it is not our purpose at this time to essay prediction or indulge in speculation. The essential fact is that the election of a Republican House would spell repudiation of the Administration, while the return of a Democratic majority, however greatly reduced, would signalize the most striking personal triumph of any President since Andrew Jackson overwhelmed the opposition in 1832. Now, as then, the issue is not a party, but a personality, so completely has Mr. Wilson by sheer force of intellectual vigor and unsurpassed power of resolution dominated the political aggregation which even to-day, after two years of full authority, can hardly be designated, in comparison with the Republican phalanx in the fullness of its strength, as an organization. The one question, then, which American citizens must answer at the polls in November is this:

Has President Wilson kept the faith?

If so, refusal to accord him a vote of approval and confidence would be unworthy of the American people—a reflection not upon their President, but upon themselves. Happily, unlike in 1906, the expression will not be that of emotionalism inspired by personal idolatry, but one of calm, sober judgment based upon discriminative consideration of actual value to the commonwealth of public service rendered by a chosen magistrate. From that viewpoint, looking to the future, it is necessary in this time of unprecedented peril throughout the world to take a survey of conditions prevailing in both Europe and the Far East, but, even so, attention must be given to the successes and failures of domestic administration if a true balance is to be struck. A brief review will suffice.

TARIFF REFORM

The leading declaration of the Democratic platform reiterated emphatically and unequivocally as a “fundamental principle” of the party “that the Federal government under the Constitution has no right or power to impose or collect tariff duties except for the purpose of revenue,” but the candidate wisely refrained from committing himself to a proposition so difficult, in the light of precedent and prac-

tice, to sustain. While not admitting, he did not deny, the power of the Government to impose duties for the encouragement and protection of domestic industries. What he objected to was the utilization of such authority, whether strictly constitutional or not, as a means, not of "setting up an equitable system of protection," but of "fostering special privilege." Upon that solid ground he took his stand and promised "immediate revision, downward, unhesitatingly and steadily downward." The pledge was fulfilled so promptly and so effectually that the tariff can hardly be reckoned an issue in the present Congressional campaign. So far, at any rate, no responsible Republican leader has had the hardihood to raise it, and none, if prudent, will do so. That changes in tariff duties will be made from time to time to conform to varying conditions is a simple matter of course, but there will be no more revisions upward.

The country knew what it was doing when it reinstated the Democratic party. It was decreeing more than a mere lowering of duties; it was adopting a fixed policy correctly interpreted by the candidate as "steadily" downward. The enactment of another general Tariff Bill in many years to come, if indeed ever, is unlikely. Now that the general rule of cautious but undeviating reduction has been established, there remains no reason for continuing purely economic adjustments within the scope of partisan politics. That the President has in mind the creation of machinery to that end seems to be apparent and there need be no anticipation that he will be deterred from his purpose by the claim of origination loudly heralded by the leader of what is left of the Progressive party. In this instance, as in many another, the difference in motive and attitude between Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Wilson is distinct. The former espouses a new plan to evade an old issue; the latter adopts it for its inherent merit.

Of the technical quality of the Tariff Bill finally enacted it suffices to say that it satisfies the promise. While agreeing with Mr. Underwood and disagreeing with the President as to the advisability of removing the duties upon sugar, we cannot gainsay that Mr. Wilson's insistence was in strict accord with innumerable specific declarations of his party and with his own laudable determination to shift the burdens of taxation, so far as can be equitably done, from the backs of the toilers to the shoulders of those better able to bear

them without discomfort. Herein, then, we find no ground for criticism from intelligent and far-seeing citizens who realize that the shameful injustices and inequalities which were fostered by a greedy and arrogant Republican oligarchy must be eliminated if the Republic is to endure.

Of the Income Tax it need only perhaps be said that it was no less essential as a corrective than tariff reductions; was necessary; was inevitable; is just. A cumbersome measure susceptible of improvement such as will be demonstrated in practice, no doubt! In theory, too, it is fallacious in its most highly lauded provision of "taxing at the source." This method, savoring as it does of the indirection which characterized excessive tariff taxation, not only approaches far too closely the vicious system of the past which permitted the mulcting of the people without their knowledge, but in large measure defeats the primary purpose of such legislation to inculcate in the minds of voters the pressing need of economy in government. If the facts could be ascertained, moreover, we have little doubt that much of the disappointment at the sums realized is attributable to this defect. But simplification will ensue in time as a consequence of experience; of that we may be certain.

Meanwhile, no meed of credit should be withheld from the Administration for the revolution it has worked in the principle of taxation, to the continuing and increasing relief of the struggling poor. To our mind, no words of the President have been more worthy or becoming than those simple ones in which he voiced the realization of a lifelong aspiration shared, as he intimated, by thousands of others who were bred in the belief that common humanity is an essential element of intelligent patriotism.

"I have had the accomplishment of something like this at heart," he said, when he signed the Bill, "ever since I was a boy, and I know men standing around me who can say the same thing—who have been waiting to see the things done which it was necessary to do in order that there might be justice in the United States."

To that we say, Amen! In his first great test, President Wilson kept the faith.

CURRENCY REFORM

The oddly haphazard and positively hidebound banking system of the United States was conceded universally to be

antiquated and ill adapted to public needs a full dozen of years ago. To the restrictions imposed by it more than to any other one cause was due the lamentable panic of 1907, whose consequences might easily have been direful beyond computation but for the energy manifested at the crucial moment by individuals under the truly patriotic lead of Mr. Morgan. The mere fact that a condition thus dependent for relief upon unofficial succor could exist in a country of abundant resources was more than disconcerting; it was so startling that the leaders of the Republican party in Congress undertook reformation with commendable promptitude and painstaking thoroughness. Surely the day will come, if indeed it is not already here, when due credit will be accorded Senator Aldrich for his untiring endeavors which fructified, strangely enough, under a Democratic Administration.

But nothing was accomplished; legislative performance by a political organization which was under private control and public suspicion was impossible; co-operation of clique and community was simply unattainable. It was a situation which might readily have feazed one who, like Mr. Wilson, could not assume to possess exceptional knowledge of the many intricate problems pertaining to National, State, commercial, and personal finance. But he could not fail to recognize the existence of a fact which constituted a positive menace, and, to his honor be it said, he grappled what must have seemed to be an enigma with no less hesitation or resolution than in his callow days he must have undertaken the solution of a problem in Euclid. That he succeeded eventually is now generally conceded—a notable achievement surely in itself, but rendered greater to our mind by the open-minded readiness with which he accepted from sources theretofore distrusted suggestions of obvious improvement upon the quite hopeless statute first submitted to the House of Representatives. The very fact that the new law bears little resemblance to the original so-called Administration Bill is a compliment, not a discredit, to a President who in this instance at least proved himself willing to profit from common counsel.

True it is that the measure has yet to justify itself through prudent administration, but there can be no question that the binding cords which fettered our currency and which the Republican party was incapable of severing have

been cut; that ample safeguards against undue inflation are provided for exercise by a competent Reserve Board; that inducements to use rather than to hoard capital are multiplied; that insensate panics can never again possess the people; and, best of all, that the power of cure lies, not in individuals susceptible to caprice or hope of personal gain, but in the government of the Nation responsible to all.

Tariff reform was a party obligation definitely presaged by the Democratic House under the leadership of Speaker Clark and Mr. Underwood. Currency reform is President Wilson's own accomplishment, and, in our judgment, considering the vagaries within his own party and the obstacles raised from without no less than the illimitable benefits certain to accrue, it is the most signal achievement in the interest of the whole people of any President since Abraham Lincoln signed the Emancipation Proclamation.

Again we say, President Wilson kept the faith when hardly another would have been so redoubtable as to essay the undertaking.

THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE TRUSTS

Whether or not the anti-trust legislation demanded by the President will prove beneficial or only confusing is a matter of conjecture, but there can be no doubt of the breadth and effectiveness of the Administration's methods of compelling interstate corporations to comply with both letter and spirit of the law. There has been no beating of tom-toms such as characterized the sheer antagonism of Mr. Roosevelt, and there has been a marked improvement upon the course pursued under Mr. Taft. In the face of no little clamor from his own party's organs, the President has steadfastly sustained the Department of Justice in its earnest endeavors to right wrongs without wrecking properties. No less commendable than its firm insistence upon law observance has been its fair consideration of the difficulties confronting those managers of corporations who sought only the way to conform to statute requirements.

The settlements effected in the Pacific Railways, Telephone, and New Haven cases afford ample demonstration of Mr. Wilson's sincerity in declaring at the outset that the attitude of his Administration toward large as well as small business interests would be one of active co-operation rather than of demagogic hostility. By his acts, if not so

clearly by his words preliminary to his great undertaking, the President has shown adequate appreciation of the necessity of relieving industry and commerce from the purely wanton assaults which had come to be regarded by many politicians as essential to partisan advantage. If, as may safely be assumed, the new Attorney-General shall follow faithfully the clear course marked by his predecessor, no just cause for complaint or reason for change in administration can be found on the part either of the public or of those most directly concerned.

GOVERNMENTAL EXTRAVAGANCE

The Democratic platform demanded "a return to that simplicity and economy which benefits a democratic government, and a reduction in the number of useless offices, the salaries of which drain the substance of the people." This pledge has not been kept. The appropriations of the present Congress aggregate the enormous sum of \$1,089,408,777, the largest ever recorded, exceeding even that of the preceding Congress by more than thirty millions. No "useless offices" have been abolished, and the "drain upon the substance of the people" is greatest at the very time when the effect of reduced profits and incomes is most severely felt.

Primarily, the blame for wastefulness so gross and deliberate as to constitute flagrant violation of a positive pledge must attach to the House of Representatives, which brazenly ignored the repeated admonitions of Chairman Fitzgerald, who finally in despair made this abject confession:

I am looking now at Democrats who seem to take amusement in soliciting votes on the floor of the House to overturn the Committee on Appropriations in its efforts to carry out the pledges of the Democratic platform. They seem to take it to be a huge joke not to obey their platform and to make ridiculous the efforts of the members of our party who do try to live up to the promises they made to the people. . . .

We charged the Republicans for twelve years of my service in the House under Republican administration with being grossly extravagant and reckless in the expenditure of the public money. I believed that charge to be true. I believed that my party, when placed in power, would demonstrate that the charges we had made in good faith were true. We are entitled to the help and to the support of the members on this side of the House in honest efforts to carry out the pledges of the Democratic party, and in our attempts to show that what we charged in order to get into power was true. We have not had that support. Our Democratic colleagues have not given that support to us thus far during this

session of Congress. They have unnecessarily piled up the public expenditures until the Democratic party is becoming the laughing-stock of the country.

Democratic Senators have been hardly less heedless, and we believe it to be a fact that the only reduction effected by an Executive Department was \$120 reported as having been saved by the Secretary of State.

Whether President Wilson could have checked the rapacity of his followers in any case is perhaps a question, but it must be recorded to his disadvantage that if he has ever tried to do so the fact has not been evidenced, and that the appropriations recommended with his acquiescence far exceed those ever before submitted. Indeed, the readiness with which he has accepted proposals involving huge expenditures for such dubious adventures as railway-building in Alaska and the purchase of steamships induces the inference that Mr. Wilson, like Mr. Roosevelt, and unlike Mr. Cleveland, not only regards the appropriating body as responsible, but also minimizes the importance of expenditures as contrasted with accomplishments. The charge of inconsistency cannot lie again against him because, in the face of party tradition and declaration, at no time during his canvass did he emphasize retrenchment as an issue.

That a change of viewpoint may be the consequence of justifiable criticism by his political opponents during the present campaign is, we hope and trust, within the range of probabilities.

CLASS LEGISLATION

The "one big blot" on the record of the Administration, we reiterate emphatically, is the initiation of class legislation in specious guise at the behest of Mr. Samuel Gompers. The best that can be said of the amendment to the Clayton Act finally substituted by the Senate is that it is less brazen and vicious than the provision originally adopted by the House; but differentiation between groups of persons is still recognized, "equality before the law" as a fundamental tenet is tacitly abandoned, and the burden of interpreting an ambiguous statute is wrongfully imposed upon the courts. That this iniquitous legislation is hardly less repugnant to the President than to every other discerning person he made sufficiently clear in his memorandum, but apparently he felt powerless to resist the pressure of the mis-

guided labor-unions, reinforced by practically unanimous action of a craven House of Representatives.

While freely according him due credit for his insistence upon modification by the Senate, we can find no adequate excuse for the President's attitude in this matter. The utmost that can be urged in palliation is that this is the only instance of really grave failure on his part to maintain the courage of his convictions.

CIVIL SERVICE AND DIPLOMACY

Of the Democratic party's open violations of its professions respecting the civil service, regrettable though they are, it can be truly said that they were made under severe provocation and are no worse than like offenses by the Republicans. President Eliot was quite right in pronouncing Mr. Taft's attempt to cover thirty thousand Republican postmasters into the service for life a blow at the spirit of the reform, and the Democrats were wholly justified in rescinding the regulation. Despite the fact, moreover, that in other instances the partisan Congress has belied its professions with ready effrontery, it must be recalled to his credit that the President himself has compelled rigid observance of the established regulations throughout the consular service.

The "Diplomats of Democracy" in Europe are becoming known quite unexpectedly by their works. The one shining example seems to be Ambassador Gerard, whose notable success goes far to indicate that one need not necessarily be a boob to fitly represent his country in foreign lands. Fortunately, perhaps, the pressure of arduous duties, which he seems to be performing admirably, has checked for the time Ambassador (W. H.) Page's flow of humorous eloquence, and only words of praise are spoken of Ambassador Thomas Nelson Page and Ministers Van Dyke and Stoval. The less said of the loquacious Mr. Sharp, whose incompetency would seem to be established by the State Department's retention of Mr. Herrick, perhaps the better; but taking them as a whole we have no occasion to revise our early opinion that the European ministers appointed by President Wilson do not suffer from comparison with their predecessors. Of the envoys to South America it may be remarked with relief and gratification that nothing is heard either from or of them.

MEXICO

The present outcome of President Wilson's conduct of our relations with Mexico calls for special felicitations. The vexatious and perilous situation which confronted him at the outset of his incumbency was not of his making; he inherited it and with it an Ambassador of dubious quality whose indiscretions and unreliability remained to plague. In common with the most competent observers throughout the world, we regarded the President's preliminary drifting policy as unwise and his subsequent taking of sides as unjustifiable intermeddling. But what seemed practically certain to happen did actually happen only in so small a part as to be negligible. The episode at Vera Cruz, we fear, will live in history as quite as unnecessary as it was lamentable, but since the occupation now happily concluded can hardly have failed to make a favorable impression upon all fair minds in Latin America, the better understanding thus engendered of our efficiency no less than of our disinterestedness must produce results of distinct benefit.

What the future holds for our still distracted neighbor God alone knows, but the overpowering and most satisfying fact is that our own skirts are clear; war was averted at a time when subsequent events have shown avoidance was essential not only to our own well-being, but to the making of opportunity to render service to the entire world; the Administration has the advantage of acquired information and useful experience in its future dealings; and, best of all, the star of hope seems really to be rising over a people that has been cruelly oppressed for ages.

The relative parts played by prescience and good-fortune in realizing so promising an outcome need not be considered. Rather let full and ungrudging tribute be rendered to the President under whose guidance, in the most stressful and trying of circumstances, it was attained.

CONCLUSIONS

Ignoring, then, the innumerable doings and happenings of minor importance which tend so often to impair the vision, the irresistible conclusion is that the excellences of the present Administration so clearly outweigh its deficiencies that the balance in its favor is overwhelming; that the actual efficiency developed by untrained and inexperienced executive officers, under the inspiration of a chief whose un-

sparing devotedness to the performance of his manifold tasks has never been surpassed, is as extraordinary as it was unexpected; that a competent working legislative body has evolved from materials none too promising; that without achieving or assuming to have achieved unattainable perfection, Mr. Wilson as President has justified the great expectations and realized the high hopes of those whose faith was strong in his intellectual and moral attributes; that in all large essentials he has, indeed, kept faith with his conscience and the people; and that consequently he richly deserves the vote of confidence and gratitude which patriotic citizens cannot withhold from him without depreciating the value to the commonwealth of true public service.

AMERICA AND EUROPE

There remains another most vital consideration. Monarchy has failed utterly, miserably; Democracy is on trial in the courts of progress, civilization, and humanity.

We have received the following communication:

SENATE CHAMBER, WASHINGTON.

I have just read your article on "Europe at Armageddon" with absorbing interest. The entire article and especially your final appeal to the people to so conduct themselves "that, when the time shall come, as assuredly it will come, to act for the restoration of peace and good-will among distracted peoples, no bar shall cross the path of a Chief Magistrate who would crown the Republic with glory by striving as a friend among the nations of the earth," will find approval in the minds and hearts of many readers. But the paragraph which arrested my attention above all others is the following:

"Back of all, underneath all, may be the onrush of democracy, designed, indeed, by God to sweep despotism from the face of the earth and open the eyes of His children to their rightful heritage of that 'life, liberty and pursuit of happiness' whose winning through conflict constitutes the greatest boon of humankind, perhaps, in reverent truth, a Holy War!"

This states a great truth, one which we grasp hesitatingly and with dubious faith. It is a truth born of our intuition rather than our reasoning faculties, but it has been with me from the beginning of this conflict. For years the spirit of democracy has been abroad in the Old World. It has permeated the whole vast mass of society. The people have been a seething mass of discontent and restlessness, a great, mysterious powerful, questioning force. They have had but little voice and no means of public expression; nevertheless, the spirit of democracy has been at work.

I am a firm believer in the inexplicable philosophy of that kind of human progress which is started and sustained not by great personages or dominant figures nor guided by select groups of men, but which comes up by reason of the great dumb forces of oppressed and outraged and downtrodden humanity. It even seems as if the social ties and moral

ligaments spun out of human relations are quite as much beyond our understanding in their making or control as in their ending and destruction. In these great moral upheavals and humanitarian movements, kings and lords and leaders are, after all, of but small concern in their bringing on the crisis or in shaping its course or in terminating it.

This war is no more inexplicable, though on a vaster scale, than the French Revolution. It is in a sense a working out of those inscrutable forces of humanity on a more tremendous scale, a more fearful plan, but along the same lines as that which gave us the most stupendous enigma in history until now, the French Revolution.

Some will say to such reasoning as this, "Then you approve of this horrible war." One might as well ask me if I approve of the French Revolution or our own Civil War. We have but little to do with approving or disapproving of them. We can but watch the forces operate, and thank our stars that the result is almost inevitably to the betterment of humanity, strange as it may seem. Humanity seems sometimes to get in a trap, and nothing but havoc and destruction will enable it to get out of the trap—as in our own Civil War. The greatest political philosopher, and the most eloquent master of the mother-tongue, Burke, disapproved of the French Revolution, tried to analyze it, railed at Carnot and others, but the forces which brought it on carried it to its consummation. He never understood, and no one has since been able either to analyze or define them.

But of this be assured, that while the cost seems fearful and wholly unnecessary, yet old Europe is no more. The Europe of the future will be freer, a more released, a more democratic Europe—the people will have a greater voice, humanity will never be weighed down again by the accursed and infamous practices, trappings, and burdens of royalty. Even if this war should result, as did the French Revolution, in a universal dictator for a time, it will only be for a time. This is worth something, and adds a sheen of light to the fearful darkness which now falls upon Europe. I regret to have witnessed this war, but I thank God I have lived to see the beginning of the end of old Europe.

Excuse this long letter, but you are to blame, as I have just laid down the paper and am writing upon the inspiration of your splendid article.

Here speaks a statesman, one of the foremost statesmen in the land, a Republican in name, a democrat at heart, a patriot and an American. His name—which we do not feel at liberty to append—would add much weight to his graphic portrayal of a condition which makes for mighty opportunity. Consider! Nine Powers at war! But one great Nation free and unentangled, but one in position of possible arbiter of the world's destiny; and that one our own! Behold, too, the significance of recent happenings! We cannot surmise that President Wilson foresaw so imminent a need of proving America's adherence to moral might as against physical force when he proclaimed seeming altruism at Mobile. We cannot imagine that he divined the proximate

potency of strict observance of faith among nations when he demanded that our treaty with England be kept inviolate. And yet by those two acts, still fresh in mind throughout the world, the authority of the Republic was enhanced immeasurably on the very eve of a cataclysm which can never be resolved without its aid and acquiescence.

That the situation now confronting our Government and likely, in our judgment, to confront it for many months is one of the greatest delicacy, calling for the exercise of exceptional sagacity, statesmanship, prudence, tact, even intuition, should be apparent to all. The President's appreciation of the nature of the great task which has befallen him was made manifest when at the outset he solemnly enjoined personal as well as official neutrality and sought the cooperation of press and people. None, we suspect, knows better than he the futile and disabling effect of crying for peace when there can be no peace. That he will beware of premature proposals of well-meaning busybodies at the subtle instigation of one or another of the contending parties, keen for commitment, craving a cat's-paw, we may be assured from the perfect responses already made to direct representations. If ever there was a time when "they also serve who only stand and wait," it is now.

The President promptly, as in duty bound, made his proffer of good offices; there he stopped; there he should remain, ready and willing, but never betraying eagerness to act.

That he will prove his mastery of the situation need not be doubted, but he needs the help of all. His hands should be strengthened by a vote of confidence, not weakened by seeming division. Now more than ever before or perhaps ever again it behooves our country to stand behind its leader united before the world. Whatever of disaffection may exist in the Democratic party, whatever of partisan feeling among Republicans, whatever of discontent among Progressives must be brushed aside for the time if the greatest glory is to be won for the Nation and for democracy in achieving the goal of all mankind—the *disarmament of the world*.

The choice of State and municipal officers may well, as ever, be based upon local considerations, but in the election of Congressmen citizens should realize the gravity of the responsibility which they must face at the polls on Novem-

ber 3d. These facts seem both obvious and certain: They cannot return an opposition Congress without repudiating an Administration which has served them faithfully and well; without exalting blatant demagoguery over quiet efficiency as possessing popular appeal; without testifying lack of appreciation of a President who has done not merely his own best, but better than any other since Lincoln; without evincing a preference for government given to special privilege over government dedicated to service of the whole people; without impeding the progress of true democracy through enlightenment and resolution; without inviting a return from sober but steady advancement to the old, hateful, and utterly futile striving between the extremes of radicalism and Bourbonism; and, finally, without seriously impairing the effectiveness of their own Chief Magistrate's patient and noble endeavors in the cause of civilization and humanity through re-establishment of peace among the distracted Nations of the earth.

Our appeal is to all good citizens,—first, to register without fail; secondly, to vote, not as partisans, but as patriots; and, finally, to uphold the President who has kept the faith among peoples and among men.

TURKEY AND THE GREAT WAR

AMID the crash and thunder of the great European war a new note comes vibrating out of the Near East; through the smoke of French, Galician, and Bosnian battlefields we catch the loom of a gigantic figure rising over Stamboul, "the City of Constantine." The figure is clothed in khaki and carries a Mauser rifle, but above its fez-capped forehead gleams the crescent moon of Othman, while its fierce eyes shine with terrible glee as they gaze on the battling Christian world.

What is it that is stirring over there in Stamboul, that open gateway through which Asia's armies have poured into Europe these past five hundred years? We do not know. Vague rumors assail our ears; tidings of mobilization in Asia Minor, reports of great Mohammedan armies gathering on Turkey's shrunken Thracian frontier. For the rest, the wires to Stamboul are down, the Dardanelles are closed, the Euxine has become a sea of mystery. Behind the veil

"Young Turkey," the Chauvinist Turkey of Enver Bey, which only a year ago tore up the Treaty of London and seized Adrianople in defiance of Europe, is preparing—what? We do not know. But this much we do perceive. The Turkish Government is displaying toward the embattled Allies—England, France, and Russia—a provocative haughtiness that increases with every day, while Ottoman diplomats throughout the world are using language seldom heard in the guarded conversations of the Chancelleries. German battle-cruisers have been taken into Turkish service, and the Ottoman Government has answered the Allies' protests by inquiring what they were going to do about it. The Turkish Ambassador to Washington has countered on our proposal to send a war-ship to Constantinople for the relief of our nationals in Ottoman territory by a most extraordinary press interview criticizing our own domestic shortcomings and asking if America wants war. Finally, to cap the climax, Turkey has cavalierly abrogated all extra-territorial rights of foreigners within its dominions—those famous "Capitulations," older than the Ottoman Empire itself, dating as they do from the special status granted the resident citizens of the Italian maritime republics by the medieval Byzantine Empire; and the Turkish Ambassador to Washington answers the chorus of astonishment at this amazing coup by simply remarking, "This war is Turkey's opportunity."

Opportunity for what? That is the question. Is "Young Turkey" seeking merely to shake off the galling trammels of European tutelage and to establish itself as sovereign master in its own house, or is it planning something more—some desperate effort to turn back the ebbing tide of Ottoman destiny, some "thunder stroke" beside which last year's defiant seizure of Adrianople and the Maritza River line shall be as the sound of brass or tinkling cymbals? Shall we presently see Turkish battle-ships bearing the Sublime Porte's "non-possumus" of the *Ægean* Islands as a cartel to the Greek fleet; Turkish armies backing the despoiled Bulgarians in an effort to rescue the Bulgars of Serb Macedonia, and spurring the Rumanians over the "Accursed Pruth" in an endeavor to revenge Russia's Bessarabian seizure of two generations ago; Anatolian redifs and Kurdish cavalry skirting the snows of Ararat to the assault of Tiflis and Kars on Russia's trans-Caucasian rear? Which of these hypoth-

eses is correct time alone will tell, and no man outside the secret councils of the Sublime Porte can speak authoritatively at the present hour. Nevertheless, even though positive prophecy be more than usually vain in this instance, an analysis of Ottoman internal conditions and of "Young Turk" psychology may not be without value. It will at least show those factors of strength upon which Turkey may rely if it decides to plunge into the European maelstrom, and it may afford some clue as to the hopes and convictions of that determined band headed by Enver Bey which now directs the course of the Ottoman ship of state.

"The Sick Man of Europe" has become a stock phrase, yet, despite all his crises, recent and remote, he looks far healthier to-day than he did one hundred years ago. It is not too much to say that the Ottoman Empire of the early nineteenth century presented as hopeless an appearance as did Morocco on its death-bed ten years since, when the Algerias Conference handed the corpse of the Shereefian Empire over to France and Spain for that modern embalming process known as "pacific penetration." A century ago the Ottoman Empire was a shining example of Taine's "spontaneous anarchy," and, furthermore, there seemed no probability that this chronic malady would end in any other fashion than by the demise of the patient. The barbaric military machine of Mohammed II. and Suleyman the Magnificent had utterly broken down and nothing had come to take its place. Beyond the walls of Imperial Stamboul the Sultan's authority had passed into the hands of a swarm of picturesque brigands, worthy prototypes of their Moorish scion the late Raisuli—ambitious upstarts like Ali, "The Lion of Janina," Djeddar Pasha, "Butcher of Acre" and doughty opponent of General Bonaparte, Mehemet Ali of Egypt, most famous of them all—a breed who honored the Sultan's writ only when it ran before the Sultan's army, and who never ceased from troubling till their pickled heads were safely landed at the Golden Horn. Furthermore, within the walls of Stamboul itself the Padisha, nominally Lord of the World, in reality trembled before his "Janissaries," those debauched and degenerate Prætorians whose interminable palace revolutions had so thinned out the imperial stock that the Sultan of the day stood as the only surviving male representative of the sacred blood of Othman.

However, that same Sultan, the grim Mahmoud II., by his

destruction of those mutinous Janissaries and rebellious provincial satraps, was destined to inaugurate that revival of the imperial authority which, despite its immense territorial losses and its crying domestic anachronisms, has transformed the moribund Oriental Sultanate of a hundred years ago into the "Young Turkey" of to-day, with its aggressive nationalistic self-consciousness and its up-to-date mechanism of a modern, centralized state. Compared with the Janissary-ridden "Empire" of Mahmoud II, the Turkey of Enver Bey, with its steel frame of strategic railways, its centralizing network of telegraph-bound civilian bureaucrats, and its khaki-clad, Krupp-gunned army mobilized to the tune of the Prussian general staff, appears a very phoenix, rising from the ashes of the past to a new and victorious future. Such certainly is the conviction of Enver Bey and his sanguine disciples. Whether or not they are right in their deductions the event alone can decide.

One thing is clear: the steady shrinkage of Turkey's European dominion during the last century has been by no means pure loss. Despite their five centuries of lordship the Turks never really took root on Balkan soil; they remained in essence an army camped amid hostile populations, who but awaited the opportunity to rise against their masters. Under these circumstances the holding of such a huge block of territory as the European Turkey of a hundred years ago, stretching as it did from the frontiers of Poland to the Morea, was an absolute impossibility; it merely meant the draining away of the Empire's very life-blood from that distant reservoir of Ottoman power, the Turkish population of the Asia Minor plateau, in a whole series of wars which might delay but could not avert the inevitable. Now at last the process is complete. Turkey is at last quit of those rebellious Balkan provinces which for so many generations have cost far more than they brought in, while retaining the one great prize on European soil—incomparable Stamboul, firmly buttressed against possible attack as it is by Adrianople and the Maritza line. Furthermore, Turkey has regained, or is regaining, most of those valuable possessions apparently lost during her European retreat. In nearly every one of her former provinces the Mohammedan population, refusing to live under Christian rule, emigrates and seeks refuge within the Ottoman frontiers. This is all the more striking when we remember that the majority of the

European Moslems are not of Turkish stock, but descend from Balkan converts to the Mohammedan faith. In many cases these people do not even speak Turkish as their native tongue. Nevertheless, the spell of Islam has proved more potent than the ties of language or of blood, and the exiles stream ceaselessly across the Ottoman borders. This is a tremendous source of strength for the Turkish Empire. These exiles for conscience' sake are not only fanatical Moslems; they are also more Turkish than the Turks, and, whatever their racial origins, they quickly blend with that genuine Turkish population which is the necessary foundation to the Turkish Empire. How important have been these accessions of strength can be illustrated by the successive migrations of the Greek Mohammedans during the last century. When the Greek Revolution ended in the loss of Hellas to the Turkish Empire some ninety years ago, the Moslem population of those regions emigrated to a man, some going north into Thessaly, just beyond the bounds of the Greece of that epoch, others taking ship to southwest Asia Minor, where their descendants form one of the most vigorous "Turkish" stocks to be found in all Anatolia. Again, when in the year 1881 Thessaly was ceded to the Greek kingdom, the grandsons of the first exiles trekked still farther north into Macedonia, and this despite the most considerate treatment at the hands of the Greek Government. Lastly, since the Balkan War of 1911-12, a perfect exodus of Macedonian Moslems has choked Turkish Thrace, Stamboul, and the Asia Minor ports with immigrant swarms whose numbers must run into hundreds of thousands. The same is true of the Moslem element in the Ægean Islands and in Crete, while from Bulgaria, Old Servia, and even distant Bosnia-Herzegovina, still other Mohammedan emigrant streams *en route* for the Turkish frontier testify, despite their Slav blood and their Slav speech, to the tremendous unity of Islam. One only of the Moslem blocks in Turkey's former provinces contributes but few emigrants to this modern Hegira of the Faith. The Albanians, although nominally two-thirds of them are classed as Mohammedans, are the exception to that Balkan rule which subordinates nationality to religion. The Greek, the Bulgar, the Serb, once he embraces Islam, disowns his blood-brethren and becomes more Turkish than the genuine Turk himself. But the "Skipetar," whether Moslem, Catholic, or Orthodox, re-

members that he is first and foremost an Albanian, and this secluded race of highlanders, living in a perpetual welter of tribal anarchy, possessed of no distinctive culture and without even an alphabet to clothe its race traditions, yet reveals an innate national consciousness perhaps unexampled in the world's history. The Young Turks discovered this to their cost in the troubled period from the Revolution of 1908 to the Great Balkan War, for it was the Albanian revolt against Young Turkey's programme of Ottomanization which split European Islam in twain and thus paved the way for the triumph of Balkan Christendom over the traditional Moslem enemy. Despite the many able men whom Albania has contributed to Ottoman history in the past, therefore, it is doubtful whether the distinctly nationalistic Turkey of to-day has lost much by the lopping off of this unruly member of Islam. Indeed, it is more than likely that Turkey may find independent Albania a valuable ally, whereas a subject Albania would have remained a costly and rebellious charge.

Since European Turkey is now little more than Constantinople and its military bulwarks, with a small territorial area and a population under two millions, it is Turkey in Asia which must henceforth furnish the main internal problems of Ottoman statesmanship. And as the present pilots of the Turkish ship of state examine their vast Asiatic domain they must feel a sense of relief at beholding that tide of immigrants (at the same time such good Moslems and such good Turks) setting in from Europe, together with that other and similar Circassian stream flowing into the other extremity of Asia Minor across Russia's trans-Caucasian frontier. For Asiatic Turkey has itself two great problems; one the same old feud of Mohammedan and Christian which was the bane of the lost Balkan provinces, the other a race-question within the body of Islam itself.

It is quite true that by the loss of all "Rumelia" to the very outposts of Stamboul, Turkey has become a much more Mohammedan power than before. Yet within the wide sweep of Turkey in Asia, comprising as it does the vast block of Asia Minor, the great mountainland of Armenia—Kurdistan, the wide valley-plains of the Tigris and Euphrates, the broken mosaic of Syria and the distant Arabian coast provinces of Hejac and Yemen, no less than three and one-half millions of its total population of twenty million souls profess the

Christian faith. This Christian population falls under three main heads, one and a half million being Armenians, another million Greeks, while the remainder belong to one or other of the Syrian sects. This dispersion of Asiatic Christian strength is a fortunate thing for the Turkish Empire, since even as it is the Christians' economic strength and affiliations with foreign powers render them a serious perplexity if not a positive danger to this distinctly Mohammedan state.

However, only one of these Christian elements of Asiatic Turkey, the Greeks, can be said to constitute a pressing political danger to the Ottoman Empire to-day. The Syrian sects, though aggregating nearly a million souls, are too divided among themselves and too dispersed among larger masses of Mohammedan population ever to afford much anxiety to the Turkish Government. Were it not for the possibility that some of them may be used as cat's-paws by European powers anxious to obtain a foothold in those regions, the Syrian Christians could be safely disregarded by Ottoman statesmen. As things are, however, the Turkish Government must keep an eye on such an eventuality, the French "protectorate" of the Catholic Maronites of Lebanon being the most notable case in point. Neither can the Armenians, though the most numerous element in Anatolian Christendom, be said to offer any special perplexities to Ottoman statesmanship at the present hour. Twenty years ago there was, in a certain sense, an "Armenian question." The extraordinary industrial and commercial aptitude of the Armenians had made them the middlemen in the economic revival of Asiatic Turkey, and this favored position had brought them such an increase in wealth and population that many Armenians began to dream of a national revival despite the fact that the Armenian population nowhere formed a clear majority over the other race elements. These sentiments presently crystallized in the "Hunchakist" movement, whose radical wing aimed clearly at the establishment of an autonomous Armenia by revolutionary means. To-day, however, things are entirely changed. The terrible programme of massacre and spoliation carried on by Abdul Hamid for so many years has greatly reduced the Armenian population, and has seriously compromised its economic ascendancy. Nevertheless, strange though this may at first sight appear, the Armenians are more loyal to Mohammedan Turkey than they were before the beginning of the massacres

twenty years ago. The reason for this apparent inconsistency is the fact that the Armenians see themselves menaced by two new dangers from the side of Christendom more serious to their future than the old Islamic peril itself; the politico-religious threat of Russia and the economic pressure of the Greek. The persecutions suffered of late years by their brethren of trans-Caucasia at Russian hands in the Muscovite endeavor to force the Armenians within the Orthodox Church have alarmed the Armenians of Turkey to the highest degree, and have caused them to forget the bloody past in their present interest to avoid falling under Russian domination by preserving the territorial integrity of Asiatic Turkey. The Armenians know that their race-life is bound up with the continued existence of the Armenian Church; they also know that if Turkey falls the Armenian plateau becomes a Russian province. Accordingly, they prefer to endure an occasional outburst of Moslem fanaticism rather than risk a ruthless Russification which would threaten their whole race-identity.

The second source of Armenian solicitude involves the one pressing danger which Anatolian Christendom presents to the Ottoman Empire—the Greek peril. All Greek policy is founded upon and guided by one deep-seated resolve, known as the “Great Idea.” Now the Great Idea means the reunion of the whole Greek race in a “Greater Greece,” which shall revive both the glory of ancient Hellas and the power of the mediæval Byzantine Empire. As such it involves not only the taking of Constantinople (where the Greeks are to-day almost as numerous as the Turks), but also the conquest of Asia Minor, where a million Greeks form an almost continuous ribbon of population along the coasts and headlands, thickest on the western Ægean shore, but extending north and east along the Black Sea coast well beyond Trebizond and almost touching the Russian trans-Caucasian frontier. Furthermore, this Greek population is growing rapidly in both numbers and prosperity. Protected by foreign influence from Moslem violence, the energetic Greek farmer is steadily supplanting the easy-going, overtaxed Turkish peasant, and is pressing up the river valleys toward the inland cities where the keen-witted Greek merchant is wrestling from the half-ruined Armenian his former commercial supremacy. It is these things perhaps far more than wounded national vanity which has made the

“ Young Turk ” Government obstinately refuse the cession of those large islands just off Asia Minor’s Ægean shore, for it must be perfectly clear to any competent observer that if these islands form part of that victorious Greece already supreme throughout the Ægean sea, the dense Greek population of the mainland will be stirred to such a pitch of irredentist fervor as must lay Asia Minor open to a perpetual menace of rebellion.

And these facts acquire further significance when we remember that Turkey must at all costs keep unbroken hold of Asia Minor, since the Anatolian plateau is the home of the real Turkish race—that great block of ten million genuine “ Osmanli ” which is the very bone and sinew of the Empire. No finer peasantry exists than these folk—frugal, good-hearted, and infinitely patient, albeit long impoverished and declining in numbers—since the Turkish peasantry has been conscripted to death for endless European wars and taxed to death for the support of a prodigal court and a corrupt officialdom. However, the stamina of the Anatolian peasant seems to have successfully resisted all his past misfortunes, and still offers a sound and solid base for the erection of that rejuvenated Ottoman Empire which is the ardent dream of Young Turk statesmanship.

The great problem which must be solved, if a strong Mohammedan Empire stretching from Stamboul to Bagdad and from Kurdistan to Yemen is to arise and bid defiance to encroaching Christendom, is involved in that race question within the body of Islam of which we have already made passing mention. In Asia Minor (save for its Greek coastline and the nomad tribes of Tartar “ Yuruks ” in the alkali deserts of its dried-up Dead Sea basin) all is Osmanli. But, once through the gorges of the Taurus Mountains, we leave the Turk behind and enter into another land—the land of the Arab. And the Arab, whether the mongrel villager of Syria and Mesopotamia or the pure-blood Semite nomad of the desert, never forgets that he springs from the race of Mohammed and should, therefore, be esteemed of Islam’s “ Chosen People ”; he holds it high injustice that the Turk, that heavy-witted intruder from distant Turan, should rule the Prophet’s own race, and that the Turkish Sultan should claim Arabia’s spiritual allegiance as “ Commander of the Faithful.” Indeed, a whole series of revolts, beginning immediately after the Turkish conquest of Syria four centuries

ago and extending down to the recent rising in Assy and in Yemen, testify to the Arab's dislike of Turkish rule. One thing is very evident. Young Turk statesmen will have to discover some *modus vivendi* for Osmanli and Arab if their dream of a broad-based Moslem Empire is to become a reality. Any thought of Ottomanizing the six million Arabs of Syria, Mesopotamia, and the Red Sea littoral may as well be dismissed as the most dangerous of absurdities, for the Semite will never consent to merge his ancient individuality in that of the Turk, who is indebted to the Arab for his faith, his alphabet, and nearly all the finer flowers of his civilization.

Such are the elements composing the modern Ottoman Empire, such the problems immediately facing Young Turk statesmanship. It now remains to discover who and what are these "Young Turks," how they came to be, and in what spirit they will probably guide the destinies of their country.

Speaking in the broadest and most fundamental sense, the Young Turk movement may be said to have begun just about a century ago, during that period of utter anarchy already described when the Ottoman Empire had sunk to the level of Shereefian Morocco, with every apparent prospect of ending in a similar manner. And, paradoxical though this may seem, the first "Young Turk" of note was undoubtedly that stern Sultan Mahmoud II, who plucked his empire from its nadir of decrepitude and set it on the path to better things. True, Mahmoud's chief endeavor was the strengthening of his own unlimited authority. Yet he understands but little of this movement who would restrict the term "Young Turk" to those near-Parisian dandies, full of half-digested Western "liberalism," who proclaim their free thought by getting drunk on sweet champagne. Mahmoud II was far nearer than these frothy doctrinaires to the realist, fiercely Ottoman "Young Turkey" of Enver Bey. Mahmoud recognized the following chain of facts: (1) Old Turkey was helpless in face of Modern Europe; (2) Turkey must reform itself if it was to escape a European conquest; (3) to do this Turkey must discover and employ the secrets of European superiority. This is the problem which the genuine Young Turks are trying to solve. They do not in the least intend to make themselves over into imitation Europeans; they aim to assimilate Europe's strength, and then to fight

encroaching Europe with its own weapons. The Japanese have apparently solved the problem; it remains to be seen whether Young Turkey can solve it as well.

True, Mahmoud II was not a very judicious borrower of European innovations. As might have been expected from one who viewed the West from the lattices of the seraglio, he too often confounded the substance with the shadow, and thus drew down upon himself the purblind fanaticism of his reactionary subjects. This Ottoman Peter the Great encountered upon the pathway of reform the same irritating experiences as his great Russian predecessor, and the cross-belts of his European-drilled troops aroused as much wrath in Islam as Peter's clipping of Boyars' beards had ever done in Byzantine Moscow. He died a disappointed man and his empire experienced more than one reactionary lurch during the succeeding half-century. Nevertheless, Turkey gradually acquired both the material framework of a European state and an *élite* of educated men who might accomplish something when the right time came. Even the thirty years of Hamidian rule preceding the Revolution of 1908 were not quite so black as they have usually been painted; Abdul Hamid had in many ways a pretty clear idea of realities, and though his "mania of persecution" threw him into the hands of knaves and charlatans who made genuine reform impossible, his able German mentors like Von der Goltz and Marschall von Bieberstein did manage to keep up the army, build strategic railroads and (most important of all) send bright young officers to get their eyes opened at the *Kriegsschule* of Berlin. Thus, despite the blight of the Yildiz Kiosk camarilla, the seed continued to sprout after a fashion, and the Revolution of 1908 was rendered an ultimate certainty.

But there appear to have been two varieties of this Young Turk seed, which one may respectively consider as the wheat or the tares, according to one's point of view. There was first that school of thought (exemplified by Midhat Pasha and his short-lived Parliament of 1877), which came so prominently to the fore after the 1908 Revolution. These men must in no sense be classed with the cosmopolitan libertines of the Paris cafés; they were genuine Turks, proud of the fact, and not in the least desirous of hiding their individuality behind a Western veneer. Nevertheless they proposed for Turkey a Western innovation of the most funda-

mental character. In their eyes the mainspring of Western strength was the principle of "nationality," by which all the citizens of a modern European state are welded into a territorial "patriotism" by a predominant language, standardized education, and common parliamentary institutions. When we remember that the "Old Turk" theory was essentially that of a Mohammedan army living in perpetual "free quarters" at the expense of a subject Christian population, we can see how sweeping was the innovation proposed by Midhat Pasha and his school.

Well! The Midhat theory of a "National" Ottoman state on the Western model without distinction of creed has been tried out in the four-year period from the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 down to the Balkan War of 1912; and it has not proved a brilliant success. At the moment of victory, of course, Christian and Mohammedan fraternized in most edifying fashion under the spell of a common joy at being relieved of the common Hamidian tyranny. But just as soon as the Young Turks began to suggest their panacea of an "Ottoman" nationality, regardless of creed, indeed, but based on the Turkish language and Young Turk institutions, the dream was over. Indeed, in one sense, the Balkan Christians—Greek, Serb, and Bulgarian alike—were more incensed at the Young Turk theory than at the Old, for the exclusive, Islamic Turkey of the past had at least left their race-lives undisturbed and had no desire to convert them *en masse*, whereas the Young Turks threatened to deprive them of those immemorial heirlooms of speech and culture of which their religion was but the sign-manual. So menacing was the attitude of these "fellow-citizens" that the nationalist doctrinaires of the Constantinople Parliament let them alone for the moment and turned their Ottomanizing energies upon the Albanians, with the result that Balkan Mohammedanism was split in twain and the way opened for the triumph of Balkan Christendom. Last, but not least, the replacement of Islam by "Nationalism" as the basis of the Ottoman State estranged and infuriated the Arab portions of the Empire, for what bond now remained between the race of Mohammed and those impious Turanian renegades beyond the Taurus Mountains? In fine, the bubble of Young Turk "National Liberalism" was pricked in the *débâcle* of 1912, and apparently it has vanished for good and all, leaving not a wrack behind.

Yet, there is a "Young Turk" Government at Stamboul to-day? Very true. But not that of Midhat Pasha and the Nationalist parliamentarians: it is the Young Turkey of Enver Bey, girt with the sword of Othman and bestriding an Arab steed, which now grasps the reins of authority. The second school of Young Turk thought has at last come into its own. This school has the greatest respect for German army officers, Krupp guns, and Vickers-built battle-ships, but it has very little faith in Western nationalism or parliamentary government; it believes in Islamic civilization and a Mohammedan Ottoman Empire; it fears and hates Christendom as its natural and remorseless enemy. With mingled feelings of cynical amusement and impotent fury it has witnessed the Christian reply to the "Liberal" Turkey of 1908: Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Italian seizure of Tripoli, Christian "fellow-citizen" soldiers deserting wholesale to the enemy, London partition conference of 1912. Really, concludes Enver Bey, beneath the smooth surface of diplomacy lurks ever the "Jihadd," the Holy War! Such being the case, these Young Turks reproach their sires not with barbarity, but with excessive moderation. Listen to this comment, made nearly forty years ago: "If in its day the dynasty of Mohammed II. had followed the example of Philip II., if it had expelled or exterminated the Christians as the son of Charles V. did the Moors of Spain, the whole Balkan peninsula would to-day be peopled by good Mussulmans, impervious to the influence of Europe and energetically responsive to the Khalifate of Stamboul." No talk here of Ottoman "nationality" or the Turkish language; Islam is alone in question. This can be read and approved by Arab and Kurd, or, for that matter, by any good Moslem on the Congo, the Ganges, or the Tian Shan. On this point old Abdul Hamid never strayed so far from the path, after all, with his clique of Senussi dervishes and his itinerant mollahs in Algeria, Bengal, Sulu, and Turkestan preaching the unity of Islam and telling of the common spiritual overlord, the great Khalifa, in Stamboul. What a welder of Osmanli, Arab, and Kurd—a "Jihadd" against the insolent Greek "Roumies" and the accursed Russians of the North! How the news would fly over the Moslem world and be threshed out in that peerless clearing-house of ideas and plans the Kaaba of Mecca at pilgrimage time! Of course, there would

be England and France to reckon with, or what little of them could be spared from the death-struggle in the West. But England has India and Egypt, France has her North African Empire—some ninety million Mohammedans all told, and most of them "first-class fighting men." True it is that Indian sowars and Algerine turcos are at this moment fighting the Allies' battles in France and Flanders, but would they charge the German lines so gaily if to-morrow French and English battle-ships should bombard the Dardanelles? India has always throbbed a quick response to Turkish misfortunes in the past; note the monster subscriptions during the Russo-Turkish conflict of 1877, the Moslem press campaign during the Greek War of 1897 become so violent that the Government of India forbade all Turkish books and papers, the stormy boycottings and burnings of Italian goods only three years ago. Then there is the growing Egyptian unrest, which moved Mr. Roosevelt to his Guildhall warnings of a short time since. What would happen in Cairo if Turkish regulars and Arab tribesmen should appear out of the desert on the line of the Suez Canal?

Truly, in the lap of the gods now sits the world.

T. LOTHROP STODDARD.

WILL RUSSIA "MAKE GOOD"?

WILL Russia "make good"? That, without offense, is one of the most interesting and most important questions concerning the sequel to the European war. It is too early yet, no doubt, to consider all or many of the results of that war. But one of them is already so assured that it may be discussed almost as an accomplished fact. That is, the new era in Russia. For whatever may be the outcome of the war elsewhere and in other respects, so much is certain, that it must produce in Russia the most profound changes that that empire has known for at least half a century; and it will do that regardless of the general outcome of the war and of the course pursued by the Russian Government itself.

This is the dominant factor of the problem, that Russia has promised, substantially, self-government for Poland, and inferentially, if not specifically, for Finland also, and equal rights with all other subjects for the Jews. The fulfil-

ment of these promises will, or would, mean radical and momentous changes in the status of a large part of the Russian people, in the constitution of the Russian Empire, and in the relations between Russia and other nations, particularly with the United States. The non-fulfilment of them would mean a scarcely less radical and momentous crisis in Russian affairs, at home and abroad. The question is, Will they be fulfilled? In the terse phrase of the Man in the Street, Will Russia make good?

Without being too cynical, we may readily interpret her motives and purpose in making the promises. They were an essential and salient part of the grand strategy of the war. It was obvious at the beginning that the first and perhaps the decisive stage of Russia's war with Germany was to be waged among the Poles and Jews. Austria's attack upon Russia was made in Russian Poland. Russia's counter attack upon Austria and her ally, Germany, was made in their Polish provinces. Nothing was more clear or certain than that the attitude and course of the Poles would be of great importance. If Poland, deeming Russia's extremity her opportunity, rose against the Czar to welcome the Austrians as liberators, the Russian campaign would be from the first defensive instead of aggressive. If the Poles of Galicia and Silesia played against Russia the part which Belgium played against Germany, the Muscovite march to Vienna and Berlin would be slow and hard indeed. Moreover, those countries and the adjacent provinces of southern Russia were those in which Jews most abounded, and their attitude, and that of their fellows in other parts of the world—for instance, in the money-markets—would be another important factor in the war. In part, therefore, Russia's promises to the Poles and Jews were conceived and made as war measures, calculated to retain the loyalty of the Poles in Russia and to detach that of those in Austria and Germany from the support of those countries.

In that extent they have already proved successful. There has been a tremendous rallying of Poles, both in and out of Russia, to Russia's support, with a correspondingly great influence upon the fortunes of the war. The Jews, also, are supporting the Czar's government, and we hear of them fighting valiantly in his army, and of their receiving, for the first time in history, commissions' as commanding officers. Evidently, then, both Poles and Jews accept the Rus-

sian promises as made in good faith and believe that they will be fulfilled.

For that belief there are strong reasons, regardless of the outcome of the war. Let us first consider the gross improbability of Russia's defeat. In that case she would have failed to attain the object for which she made the promises. Nevertheless, she would for her own sake be under all the stronger need of fulfilling them. She would need to do all in her power to conciliate her own subjects and to retain their loyalty. For her to repudiate those promises would be to add domestic disaffection to foreign defeat. On the other hand, to fulfil them loyally would be to confirm domestic solidarity and thus partly to compensate her for what she had lost or had failed to win. It will be remembered that her defeat in the Crimean War was soon followed by the emancipation of the Serfs.

On the other hand, if Russia is victorious in the war, as now seems altogether probable, she will still have to deal with her allies in determining the conditions of peace. She will doubtless wish to take from Austria and Prussia at least their Polish provinces, and perhaps something more. Great Britain and France might well demur to that if it was to mean nothing more than an addition to Russia's old oppressed, discontented, and semi-insurgent Poland; particularly since the Poles in Galicia have been far more contented with their lot than those of Russian Poland and the change for them would thus be much for the worse. But nothing would so much incline Great Britain and France to give their approval to such acquisition by Russia as the assurance that thus the "Polish question" would be satisfactorily settled by the reconstruction of an autonomous Kingdom of Poland. That might even move them to assent to Russia's annexation of some of Prussia's Baltic provinces and ports which would give her a frontage upon that open sea which she has so long desired.

Those two major allies of Russia have also, with the United States, a direct and deep interest in the fulfilment of the Russian promise to the Jews. Russian discrimination against that people has been a cause of diplomatic friction on more than one occasion, and almost constantly a cause of profound dissatisfaction. It led to abrogation of the only general treaty between this country and Russia. That it has brought world-wide reproach upon Russia is not to be

denied. Her fulfilment of her promise to the Jews would be of immense practical value to her, both at home and abroad. It would secure for her the active support of one of the strongest and most vital elements of her population, and it would commend her in an immeasurable degree to the confidence and regard of all liberal and equitable governments and peoples throughout the world.

For these reasons, then, the fulfilment of the Russian promises is to be expected. There are other reasons. Before the war, before the war was seen to be impending, Russia took some significant steps in the same direction, indicating that the making of the promises was not altogether a war measure. For a long time the practical administrative advantages of a federated over a centralized empire have been under official consideration in the highest departments of the Russian Government. It has openly been urged by authoritative statesmen that for some of the Czar's many titles to be made real instead of merely nominal would enhance rather than diminish his power and dignity. They have urged that he should be formally crowned King of Poland at Warsaw, precisely as the Austrian Emperor is crowned King of Hungary at Budapest, or, perhaps more correctly, as he should be crowned King of Bohemia at Prague. A detailed scheme for such federation of the Empire has been for some time before the Czar, receiving his careful and not unfavorable attention. The reconstruction of a Kingdom of Poland, including Galicia, Silesia, and Posen, perhaps with the capital at Cracow, as of old, would accord with the adoption of this scheme.

There was also before the war some earnest consideration of the status of the Jews, and of the necessity of doing something to rid Russia of the reproach of intolerance and persecution. Strangely enough, this arose from a governmental act of additional oppression. The Minister of the Interior, Mr. Maklakoff, last spring ordered the withdrawal of all Jews from the boards of directors of Russian stock companies. For this there seemed to be no reason, save an unintelligent spirit of reaction, and it aroused so many protests, from Gentiles as well as Jews, that the Czar himself was moved to inquire into the wisdom and profit of such a step. The result was to start consideration of plans for the gradual removal of Jewish disabilities and abolition of the Pale. What progress would have been made in this di-

rection had the war not occurred it is impossible to say. Now, however, with complete Jewish emancipation in the army, it would be indeed strange if a like reform in civil life did not speedily follow.

The triumph of the Allies would mean enormous increase of Russian prestige in Europe. If that were to mean the Russianization of Europe it would be an unspeakable calamity. If it were to mean the liberalizing of Russia it would be an inestimable blessing. That it will mean the latter is the purport of the promises which Russia has made; and which not only her allies, but also the whole world, will expect her to fulfil.

AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL INDEPENDENCE

THERE is in the European war a strong suggestion of the desirability of a larger measure of industrial independence, or of self-sufficiency, for the United States. It seems likely that there will be a large and gratifying restoration of the American commercial marine; but that will not be sufficient. In spite of all our industrial growth, we need additional manufactures as well as shipping, as the present war has strongly and most unpleasantly reminded us.

We have often vaunted ourselves upon our advantages over such nations as England which are not self-sustaining, but are dependent upon us or others for their food-supply. One of the most serious problems for such a nation in case of war is that of keeping open lines of communication and traffic with the lands from which it gets its foodstuffs. That is a problem with which we should not be troubled, for while we do, in fact, import much of our food, we are ourselves quite capable of producing all that we absolutely need.

But in the arts and industries we have permitted ourselves to become so largely dependent upon other nations that a war such as the present causes much business distress, and if prolonged may actually paralyze important industrial establishments. And that is because of our failure to produce here our own supplies of essential things which are perfectly susceptible of production here, and of which, in fact, we supply the raw material for other countries to manufacture for us.

To cite a few examples: Hydroquinone and other important chemicals used in photographic processes increased enormously, some of them from fifty to a hundred fold, at the outbreak of the war, and fears were expressed that there would soon be a famine in those articles at any price; the reason being, of course, that our supplies are chiefly obtained from Germany. Also, there were fears of scarcity of photographic glass, which comes from Belgium, and of photographic printing-paper. Yet the raw material of hydroquinone and the other chemicals in question are supplied in this country, and the processes of making them are perfectly well known here. They can be made here just as well as in Europe. So, too, can the glass and paper in question be manufactured here.

Why, then, do we depend upon other countries for such essential articles? Simply because they can produce them more cheaply than we; and they can do that because of their lower wages. The cost of human labor is so much less in Germany than in the United States that raw materials can be taken thither from the United States, worked over, and be returned to us in the finished form, duty paid, and be sold here at a lower price than Americans can afford to make the goods for here.

The same is true of dyes, particularly the aniline dyes which are so extensively used in textile and other manufactures. They are made for us in Germany, out of coal-oil or tar provided by our own country. We used to throw away what we regarded as waste products of refineries, until our German friends showed that instead of being used to pollute the waters of our harbors they could be transformed into most useful materials for the arts and industries. But we have permitted Germany very largely to do the work of preparing these valuable by-products.

Numerous drugs of the *materia medica*, including some of very common and almost indispensable use, are also manufactured for us in Germany, and the outbreak of the war sent their prices up to an almost prohibitive figure, causing great hardship to the poor, and doubtless affecting unfavorably the operations of the medical profession. And many other like examples might easily be adduced. We may, no doubt, charge some of the increase in prices to the sordid rapacity of speculators and tradesmen, who arbitrarily increased prices when there was no actual or prospective

scarcity of the goods to warrant them in so doing. But with all allowance for that discreditable circumstance, it is certain that a very marked effect was produced upon our supplies of necessities by the outbreak of the war and the consequent disturbance of European industries and interruption of commerce.

The lesson ought to be obvious and convincing, to the effect that we should produce our supplies at home, and thus be independent of wars and other vicissitudes abroad. The objection of higher cost should not be insuperable. We do not, of course, want to reduce our wages to the German level. But it is possible that improved methods of manufacture, in proximity to the places where the raw material is found and where the finished product is required, might be made fully to counterbalance the difference in wages.

One of the most familiar of politico-economical sayings is that we must not reduce our American workmen to the level of the pauper labor of the Old World. That is quite true. But what shall we say of having our industries dependent upon that same pauper labor for their essential supplies? Such dependence is what we have actually been suffering, and are suffering at the present time. It will be greatly to our profit to have this war teach us better things. It will be well to acquire a great mercantile marine, to bear our flag and our goods to all the markets of the world. It will be still better to extend the same principle to our manufacturing industries, so as to utilize for our own use our own raw products and to make this nation sufficient unto itself, at least to a much larger degree than it is at present, in material for its mills as well as in food for its people.

AUTHORSHIP OF THE SHERMAN ACT

WE have received the following letter from Mr. George M. Powell, attorney-at-law, of Jacksonville, Florida:

Sir,—I note on page 345 of your September number that you challenge the reported statement of Senator Kern (that the Sherman Anti-trust Law, as it was finally passed, was written by 'Senator Hoar of Massachusetts) as being both incorrect and ridiculous.

Owing to the fact that I have been a constant reader of your magazine for some time past, and as such have gained great confidence in the accuracy of your statements, and owing to the additional fact that I have been laboring, myself, under the impression that Senator Hoar was the

real author of the Sherman Law, I beg leave to request that you kindly give me, at your convenience, the name of the person whom you suppose wrote the law, and, if convenient, the foundation for your belief that the person mentioned wrote it. My opinion was based upon the statement to be found on page 2 of Mr. Albert H. Walker's *History of the Sherman Law*, published in 1910, from which the following quotation is taken:

"The Sherman bill was never enacted into law, but Senator Sherman in drawing and introducing that bill, and afterward in powerfully advocating its passage upon the floor of the Senate, initiated and carried far forward the movement which resulted, in the summer of 1890, in the passage by both Houses of Congress and the approval by President Harrison, of a more elaborate and comprehensive statute, which in the mean time was drawn by Senator George F. Hoar, of Massachusetts, and was substituted for the Sherman bill with the cordial approval of Senator Sherman. Inasmuch as Senator Sherman was the originator of the proposed legislation and was its leading advocate in Congress, the resulting statute has always been known as the Sherman Law, although the language of that law was written by Senator Hoar and was adopted by both Houses of Congress, without any amendment, as a more comprehensive and accurate expression of the Congressional purpose than the briefer bill which had been written by Senator Sherman himself, and introduced by him on December 4, 1889."

I am, sir,

GEORGE M. POWELL.

Subsequent to the publication of *The History of the Sherman Act—i. e.*, on July 21, 1911—the author, Mr. Albert H. Walker, addressed the following communication to Senator Moses E. Clapp:

In pursuance of your request, I submit the following report of the results of my investigations in the office of the Secretary of the Senate and in the room of the Senate Judiciary Committee, relevant to the authorship of the Sherman Law of July 2, 1890.

That statute was drawn in the Judiciary Committee in the latter part of March and the first part of April, 1890. It was based on the bill which Senator Sherman introduced as Senate Bill I, early in December, 1889, but Senator Sherman took no part in framing the substitute, which was drawn by the Judiciary Committee. That committee was composed of Senators Edmunds, Ingalls, Hoar, Wilson of Iowa, Evarts, Coke, Vest, George, and Pugh. All of its members participated in the consideration of the framing of the statute as it was reported by the Judiciary Committee, which is the exact form in which it was enacted and was approved by President Harrison July 2, 1890.

The eight sections of the statute were written by the following Senators, in the following proportions:

Senator Edmunds wrote all of sections 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6, except seven words in section 1, which seven words were written by Senator Evarts. Those are the words, "in the form of trust or otherwise."

Senator George wrote all of section 4. Senator Hoar wrote all of section 7, and Senator Ingalls was the author of section 8.

The statements of chapter II of Walker's *History of the Sherman Law*, relevant to the authorship of that statute, were based on all the published information which had ever been printed when that book was written by me in 1910. But my personal investigation of the original records of the Senate has resulted in ascertaining that the credit of the authorship of that historic statute should be distributed as it is distributed in this communication.

ALBERT H. WALKER.

This communication appeared in the *Congressional Record* of August 2, 1911, when Mr. Kern was a member of the Senate, and was reprinted in THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW for December, 1911.—EDITOR.

VARIOUS VIEWS

MR. C. V. BOWMAN writes from Boston:

I have read with great interest "Europe at Armageddon" in THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

I notice you favor neutrality on the part of the Americans. This is right and proper. However, it appears to me that you do not adhere strictly to that principle in the article. You show your readers why Servia could not accept the terms laid down by Austria. But you do not explain why Austria felt obliged to make so severe demands upon Servia. By presenting only one side of the questions involved you are not doing justice to both parties and you do not prove yourself to be neutral. As American citizens let us be fair to all nations now struggling in this most unfortunate war.

On page 345 you say: "The American people may err in holding the Kaiser chiefly responsible for wanton warfare," etc. Can you really speak for the American people in this respect? A very large number of Americans do not hold the Kaiser nor any other ruler responsible for "wanton warfare."

I have no personal interest in any of the nations at war nor have I any grudge against any of them. But I am interested in justice and fair play. In this we Americans ought to excel. Let us keep on practising.

(1) If our esteemed correspondent had not restricted his reading of the September REVIEW to the editorial articles, he would have found Austria's case set forth at length and authoritatively by her distinguished Ambassador to these United States. (2) As a simple matter of fact, not necessarily of right, we think there is no doubt that American public opinion holds the Kaiser chiefly responsible for the beginning of the great war. England has seen to that. (3) Maintenance of a neutral attitude does not necessarily involve prohibition of expression of opinion. Interchange of views fairly presented, indeed, is essential to understand-

ing. For example, Mr. William S. Bausemer writes from Baltimore:

In the September REVIEW you show with characteristic clearness that the European war started "because Serbia was reluctant to repudiate her own sovereignty; and Austria was unwilling to have an international dispute composed according to the terms of a treaty of which she herself was a signatory."

May I suggest a basic reason for Austria's intolerance of anything short of absolute compliance with her demands?

In the Teuton Empires an obsession exists for territorial expansion to the Ægean—with the political and commercial possibilities ensuing. As to this aspiration, called in the vernacular the *Drang nach Osten*, the German-American Chamber of Commerce, the writers of "The Truth About Germany," and the fulminating German college professors are just now eloquently silent.

This territorial trend, begun with the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, was halted, at the close of the Balkan War, by the expansion of Serbia over her lands reclaimed from the Turks. At that juncture the best the diplomats of the two Kaisers could do was to set up a trouble-breeder in the Balkan midst by creating the uncalled-for kingdom of Albania. Thus Greece was prevented from reasserting sovereignty over her people living in the southern part of this new kingdom; Serbia was deprived of a sea outlet, and Montenegro of her dearly won Scutari.

Russia, England, and France all patiently allowed Austria to create this useless state—with the knowledge that she would Austrianize it as much as possible. The limitations of the Balkans were even then not satisfactory to the Vienna and Berlin chancelleries. Serbia still lay across the path Ægeanward. Hence *Servia delenda est*. Her obliteration was requisite for the continuance of expansion plans. That meant war. To bring about war was simple. Accuse the Servian Government of being an accessory to the murder at Serajevo, and proceed to "execute" it.

Mr. Asquith has declared this war to be waged by the Allies "to vindicate the principle that small nations are not to be crushed, in defiance of international good faith, at the arbitrary will of a strong and overmastering power."

The Russians would indeed have been "barbarous" if they had supinely stood by and had suffered the destruction of their Serb kinsmen.

Negotiations were still proceeding between Russia and Austria (of British "White Paper") when Germany declared war, and jumped her army into unsuspecting Belgium. German officials acknowledge that France was to be "finally disposed of," and it is apparent that her extra-European territory was to be taken from her. Is such scheme merely one to free Germany from the terror of slow, unwieldy, incapable Russia? This brings us to the general query as to Teuton aggression. No less a personage than the King of Italy convicts Germany and Austria of this. The revelation to him at the outset of the war of their aggrandizing aspirations, in which he was urged to share, caused him to exclaim that he would be bartering away the honor of his country by joining in their war.

Finally, to get at the real aggressor, we have but to consider which of the European nations are territorially contented, and which are territorially restive. It is needless to refer to the various straws that in the last fifteen

years have shown how the winds of German land lust were blowing. The equivocal conduct of the German fleet when Dewey was in Manila Bay (quickly followed by German acquisition of the neighboring Caroline Islands), the intrusion at Agadir, all show her imperious desire for more territory and colonies under any pretext.

It is deplorable that the German War Lords cannot find sufficient gratification of ambitions in the magnificent achievements of their nations in science, industry, and commerce—in short, in all the arts of peace. Prussian militarism has been only too skilfully grafted upon the national life. Let us hope the intrinsically excellent German people will now discover that this incubus renders their country the “barbaric” member in the family of nations; that her own crushing armaments set the pace for the other powers; that it is not jealousy of Germany’s material successes, but fear of her desire for aggrandizement at the expense of her neighbors, that keeps up this incessant military striving.

That is Mr. Bausemer’s opinion. Then here is another from Mr. Welles Cone, of New York:

I have read and pondered your papers, and I am bound to say that nothing has appeared in contemporary literature for masterly grasp of the subject to equal them. Maine in her election yesterday corroborated your statements and thereby stamps you as a political prophet. That was discounted by your remarkable forecasts regarding the elevation of Woodrow Wilson to the Presidency of the Republic. Those forecasts, appearing in cold type and being fulfilled to the letter, were remarkable. I walked from here to Franklin Square to procure early copies of the REVIEW to place in the hands of “Gifford’s Brother Amos,” mentioned in your “Our Colonel” paper. I take pride and pleasure in circulating the documents. I hope you will favor the eager reading public with additional papers upon the all-engrossing world conflict now destroying, let us hope, the great “military menace” of Europe and the world. No one else writes with such a trenchant pen.

That is Mr. Cone’s opinion, shared, we cheerfully misdoubt, by Gifford’s Brother Amos, whom he befriended.

COMMENT

The Maine election signified little beyond the breaking up of the Progressive party. The Democrats carried the State because the opposition was divided, but their total vote was 5,916 less than in 1912 as against an increase of 5,314 opposed. In other words, they polled only 43 per cent. of the total as contrasted with 47.7 per cent. two years ago. The party cannot bear up for long under such victories. Nor is much comfort to be derived from the fact that the Republicans re-elected their three Congressmen in

spite of a Progressive vote of 17,028. It should be remembered, too, that Mr. Roosevelt, who conducted a vigorous personal canvass, cannot cover the entire United States during October. In point of fact, very few Progressive candidates for Congress will appear at all as compared with two years ago. So far as Maine is concerned, it is the old story: Republican gain 30,000, Progressive loss 31,000, Democratic loss 6,000. And yet the total Democratic vote for Congress was 700 larger than the total Republican vote,—hardly enough to write home about, but sufficient—if duplicated generally throughout the country. “Up and at ‘em!” the Progressive chief is now shouting through Kansas. Good old Colonel!

The new Attorney-General, Mr. Thomas W. Gregory, well earned his promotion by his admirable conduct of the Government’s case against the New Haven Railway monopoly. He is, moreover, as a lawyer of the first class, and the possessor of an abundance of a common sense, excellently equipped for the performance of his arduous tasks. We doubt if the President could have found a wiser counselor or a more worthy successor of Mr. McReynolds.

If it be a fact, as the Kaiser informed one of his regiments, that “we must ascribe all our successes to the God of our fathers,” to whom should be attributed the recent German reverses? Can it be possible that the impudent old Devil has the audacity to take a hand in holy warfare?

We venture to take this opportunity of again suggesting that President Wilson should approach the German Emperor and ask him for a plain declaration of what his intentions are with regard to all the treaties signed on his behalf at The Hague.—*The Spectator*.

No, thank you; let the Emperor’s Cousin George do it!

The President of the United States must maintain a sober and dignified demeanor, of course, at all times, but if Woodrow Wilson did not experience some difficulty in keeping a straight face when he read from Francisco Villa, “I

respectfully salute you as General-in-Chief of the Division of the North," we shall have to guess again.

We record as a noteworthy event the shy but firm re-appearance of Our Colonel on the first page after this fashion:

DOINGS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT

Theodore Roosevelt will be on hand to-morrow for a gathering of Progressive candidates and leaders. He will leave on Thursday for the West.

The New York *Evening Post* did it.

We have to assume that Secretary Bryan sees in the success of Mr. Roger Sullivan in the Democratic primaries of Illinois further confirmation of the high merit of popular primaries.

Did Mr. Marshall have any one in mind for a running mate when he proposed Mr. Wilson for renomination?